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COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR VIDEO GAME
PROGRAMS AND AUDIOVISUAL DISPLAYS;
AND-SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY AND THE
SCOPE OF AUDIOVISUAL COPYRIGHTS FOR
VIDEO GAMES
By Theodore J Grabowski, Jr. *
I. INTRODUCTION
"You got another quarter?" "Here's $5.00, go get me some
change." "What do you mean, no? I've almost got the pattern down.
I'm into the big points now. I've got to make 100,000 points. Don't
you understand? 100,000 points."
Pathetic. Another victim of PAC-MAN fever; a DONKEY
KONG goner;' terminal video.
What is even more distressing about this scenario is that the video
game that is being fed quarters is what is unaffectionately known in the
video-gaming industry as a "knock-off"-a counterfeit. The computer
program stored within the electronic interior of the pirated video
game's console is an identical copy of the program developed for and
placed inside a major manufacturer's copyrighted video game. The
video "poacher" has electronically pried open the memory chips
(ROMs, RAMs, or EPROMs)2 of a fully licensed and copyrighted
video game; has through reverse engineering3 removed the results of
© 1983 T.J. Grabowski, Jr.
Executive Editor, Loyola Entertainment Law Journal, 1983-84.
1. PAC-MAN is a trademark of Midway Mfg. Co.; DONKEY KONG is a trademark
of Nintendo of America, Inc.
2. There are basically three types of memory devices used in video games. ROM, or
Read Only Memory; RAM, or Random Access Memory; and EPROM or Erasable,
Programmable, Read Only Memory. Each serves the same basic purpose of storing the
computer program that interacts with the player to produce the sights and sounds of the
video game. Stern Electronics, Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 854 n.1 (2d Cir. 1982).
3. Reverse engineering is the practice of disassembling a product in order to copy its
components or design. J. Pooley, Trade Secrets 21 (1982). In the video game context reverse
engineering often involves dumping the contents of the memory chips containing the pro-
gram into the memory of a computer. A computer may then be used to analyze the contents
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countless hours of programming; and has made the duplicate memory
chips that serve as the nerve centers for the counterfeit video games.
Copyright law to the rescue. Atari, Inc., Midway Manufacturing,
Inc., Stern Electronics, Inc., and Williams Electronics, Inc.,' the major
forces in the battle against video game piracy, have resorted to the
copyright infringement action' in their struggle to keep knock-offs from
munching into their market shares. Beginning with Stern Electronics,
Inc. v. Kaufman,6 the courts have addressed a series of arguments for
and against copyright protection for video games that are as exotic as
the technology that makes video games possible.
One line of cases, comprising the bulk of video game litigation to
date,7 has been directed at the blatant copying that occurs in a knock-
of the video game memory chips in order to program duplicate chips. See Tandy Corp. v.
Personal Micro Computers, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
4. Owners or licensees of exclusive rights in, respectively, PAC-MAN (home and
arcade versions), Scramble, and Defender. Scramble is a trademark of Stem Electronics,
Inc.; Defender is a trademark of Williams Electronics, Inc.
5. Intellectual property law offers the following means of protecting computer and
video game software and hardware:
Trade secret law is most frequently associated with protecting software and hardware
from industrial espionage and defecting employees. See generally Pooley, supra note 3. See
generaly Root, Protecting Computer Software in the 80"s, 8 Rut. Computer & Technology L.
Rev. 205 (1981). See also Gilbume & Johnston, Trade Secret Protection For Software Gener-
ally and In The Mass Market, 3 Computer/L.J. 211-272 (1982).
Patent law has been used to protect hardware featues but has yet to be applied exten-
sively to computer programs. But cf., Moskowitz, Patentability of Software Related Inven-
tionsAfter Diehr, 63 J. pat. Off. Soc'y 222 (1981). See also Magnavox Co. v. Mattel, Inc.,
216 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 28 (N.D. I11. 1982).
Copyright law has been the principal means of protecting both the audiovisual display
and the underlying computer program of videogames. See Kramsky, Video Games. Scoring
Points in the Copyright Wars, 5 L.A. Law. Mag. No. 8, at 8 (Nov. 1982). Written computer
programs are copyrightable as literary works. See M. Nimmer, I Nimmer On Copyright,
§ 2.04[c] (1981).
Unfair competition and trademark laws issues are frequently involved in video game
infringement cases. Game titles are often appropriated along with the video game pro-
grams. See, e.g., Stem Electronics, Inc. v. Kaufman, 523 F. Supp. 635, 639 (E.D.N.Y. 1981)
(PAC-MAN); see also Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-America, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 125, 155 (D.
N.J. 1982) (Galaxian and PAC-MAN); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp.
466, 484 (D. Neb. 1981).
6. 523 F. Supp. 635 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), af'd, 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982).
7. Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 999 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (PAC-MAN,
Galaxian; motion for preliminary injunction granted), aft'd, No. 82-1607, slip op. (7th Cir.
1983) (available June 16, 1983, on LEXIS, PATCOP Library, Cases file); Midway Mfg. Co.
v. Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. 466 (D. Neb. 1981) (PAC-MAN, Galaxian, and Rally-X);
Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 523 F. Supp. 635 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (Scramble; motion for
preliminary injunction granted), afftd, 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982); Williams Elecs., Inc. v.
Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982) (DEFENDER; final injunction order afl'd);
Nintendo of America, Inc. v. Bay Coin Distributors, Inc., 1982 Copyright L. Rep. (CCH), p
25,409 (E.D.N.Y. May 28, 1982) (Donkey Kong; injunction issued); In the Matter of Certain
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off. Since in a knock-off there is no doubt that the statutory require-
ment of "copying" has been satisfied,' these cases have simply asked
whether video games can be copyrighted at all.
Fewer in number, but greater in significance for copyright law, is a
line of cases which do not involve such obvious and complete copying.9
In these cases a creative pirate (or, as an accused infringer might phrase
it-"a good faith imitator of ideas") has changed elements of the game
display. New characters may have been added; a maze or spaceships
may have been redesigned. These cases have asked: What aspects of a
video game will be accorded copyright protection? and: When is a
video game so similar to an already copyrighted video game that it will
be considered an infringement of the copyrighted game?
This note will explore both lines of cases. It will conclude by ex-
ploring the effect that different tests of substantial similarity may have
on the way a trier of fact decides a video game infringement case.
II. ARE VIDEO GAMES COPYRIGHTABLE?
Video games are the result of the marriage of familiar audio-visual
technology-a TV screen and speakers-with the thumb nail sized
miracle of microelectronics-the silicon chip. The microprocessor and
supporting memory chips are essentially the same components that can
be found in the new generation of home and business computers."0
Coin-Operated Audio-Visual Games and Components Thereof, 1981 Copyright L. Rep.
(CCH) p 25,299 (Int'l Trade Comm. June 25, 1981) (Galaxian; virtually identical attract
modes) (exclusion order issued).
8. To establish an infringement a plaintiff must prove ownership of a valid copyright
and "copying" by the defendant. See 3 M. Nimmer, supra note 5, at § 13.01, at 13-3. Since
direct evidence of copying is rarely available, circumstantial evidence of copying based on
evidence that the defendant had access to the copyrighted work and that the defendant's
work is substantially similar to plaintiffs work will permit a finding of copying. N. Boorstyn,
Copyright Law § 10.12 (1981). Access to the plaintiff's work is rarely contested since access
can be inferred where the product is easily available, or where the two works are so striking
similar that an inference of access is inevitable. Id at § 10.13. This inference of access may
be rebutted by evidence of independent creation and lack of access. See id The real issue in
establishing copying circumstantially, is that of demonstrating substantial similarity. Id at
§ 10.14. Substantial similarity is explored in the second half of this note.
9. Atari, Inc. v. Amusement World Inc., 547 F. Supp. 222 (D. Md. 1981) (Asteroids;
preliminary injunction den'd and judgment entered for defendant); Atari, Inc. v. North Am.
Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1982) (PAC-MAN; rev'g District
Courts denial of preliminary injunction; see lower court decision at 1982 Copyright L. Rep.
(CCH) at 25,363 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 4, 1981)), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 176 (1982); Midway Mfg.
Co. v. Bandai-America, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 125 (D. N.J. 1982) (PAC-MAN and Galaxian;
den'g plaintiffs motion for summary judgment); Atari, Inc. v. Williams, 1982 Copyright L.
Rep. (CCH) p 25,412 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 1981) (PAC-MAN).
10. Common elements in both personal computers and video games are the
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In the case of a video game, a program is written and then stored
into a series of memory chips on a printed circuit board inside the
video console. Another chip, the microprocessor, uses the program
stored in memory in conjunction with commands that it receives from
the player through "joysticks" and buttons to create the images and
sounds of the video game." It is the presence of what are essentially
computer components that has forced the courts to consider a series of
novel arguments for keeping the efforts of the video poachers outside
the reach of the traditional copyright infringement suit.
A. The Problem of Enforcing Computer Program Copyrights Against
Non-Identical Copying
Although copyright protection through registration as a literary
work is available for computer programs,' 2 software copyrights have
some serious drawbacks. One drawback is that only the particular ex-
pression of the program is protected by the copyright. 3 That is, only
the specific pattern and sequence of specific program instructions is
protected.' 4 Just as there is more than one way to add two numbers to
get for example, the number 10 (5+5, 2+8, 6+4, 9+1, etc.), there are
countless ways to write a computer program to accomplish any given
task."'
If a programmer copyrights a computer program, he is only copy-
righting one of the many ways that the program could have been writ-
ten. All that needs to be done to avoid a finding of copyright
infringement is to change the program to an equivalent non-copy-
righted pattern and sequence of program instructions.'
6
B. Audiovisual Copyrights for Video Games
1. Video Games, Computer Program Copyrights, and Audiovisual
Works
This potential obstacle to the effective enforcement of computer
microprocessor chip for executing the program; memory chips for storing the program and
other data; input devices--typewriter keyboard or game controls; and output devices-com-
puter monitors and printers or video screens and speakers. See generally Williams Elecs.,
Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982).
11. Id at 872.
12. See supra note 5.
13. Another drawback involves the question of the copyrightability of object code or
machine language. This issue is taken up later in this note.





programs copyrights threatened to spill over into the video-arcades in
Stern Electronics, Inc. v. Kaufman.' 7 A month after Stern introduced
"Scramble," its missiles and spaceships game, Omni Video Games. Inc.
began marketing a game that was virtually identical to Scramble in
sight and sound effects. 8 In opposition to a charge of copyright in-
fringement Omni advanced an argument that had been successful in
the past in thwarting computer program copyright infringement ac-
tions.'9 Omni argued that Konami Industry Co., Ltd., the licensor to
Stern, was only entitled to copyright the written computer program
stored in the video game's memory. 2" Had the court accepted this ar-
gument, it would have been hard pressed to find a copyright infringe-
ment since Konami, through its sub-licensee Stern, had not obtained a
copyright for the underlying computer program. 2'
Further, even if Stern had copyrighted the program. copyright
protection would have extended only to the specific programming
statements and structure that the original creators of Scramble had cho-
sen to incorporate into their program to produce the audio and video
display. If Omni had changed enough of these statements-and rear-
ranged the overall structure of the program-then Stern would not
have been able to demonstrate a sufficient "copying ' 22 to establish an
infringement. Despite the fact that the different statements would have
produced an audiovisual display with virtually identical sights and
sounds, there would have been no infringement.23
Stern and Konami, anticipating that a successful knock-off could
be made by changing the underlying program-the "literary work,"
had instead registered the sights and sounds of Scramble as an audiovi-
sual work. This was accomplished by submitting a video tape record-
ing taken of Scramble in play to the United States Copyright Office.
Konami believed that this form of registration would provide Scramble
with protection against unauthorized duplication analogous to that ex-
tended tapes, phonograph recordings and films under the 1976 Copy-
fight Act.24
17. 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982) (order granting preliminary injunction granted).
18. Id at 854-55.
19. See generally Stork, Legal Protection for Computer Programs; A Practicing Atorney's
Approach, 20 ASCAP Copyright L. Symp. 112, 128-29 (1972).
20. 669 F.2d at 855.
21. Id
22. See supra note 8.
23. 669 F.2d at 855.
24. See 17 U.S.C. app. § 101 (1976); 17 U.S.C. app. § 102(a)(6) (1976). Copyright filing
requirements for video game displays require that a video tape of the audiovisual display of
the game's two display modes be deposited with the United States Copyright Office. See 17
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2. Satisfying the 1976 Copyright Act: Fixation
Before the court could accept this analogy, it addressed Omni's
contention that the visual and audio displays in Scramble were neither
"fixed" nor "original" and so did not fall under the protection of the
1976 Copyright Act which provides:
Copyright protection subsists. . . in original works of author-
ship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known
or later developed, from which they can be perceived, repro-
duced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the
aid of a machine or device. Works of authorship include the
following:
(1) literary works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works;25
Additionally:
A work is "fixed" in a tangible medium of expression when its
embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the au-
thority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to
permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communi-
cated for a period of more than a transitory duration.26
Omni's argument rested on the observation that the audiovisual
display is different each time the game is played and is therefore not
"fixed."" 7 The display varies depending on how the player manipulates
the buttons or joysticks. Omni argued that this seeming lack of a fixed
sequence of images and sounds keeps video games from satisfying the
fixation requirement of the Copyright Act.
28
The Stern court was not moved by this argument.29 Instead of
U.S.C. app. § 408(b) (1976). The first mode, the "attract" mode, shows the game title and
the manufacturer's name and a copyright notice. Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l. Inc.,
685 F.2d 870, 872-73 (3d Cir. 1982). The "play" mode is the audiovisual display which
results when a coin is placed in the machine and the player uses the game controls. Id.
Copyright notices are usually placed on the game console cabinet, on the computer hard-
ware, and inside the computer program. Id. When a knock-off is found, the knock-offs
computer program often still has the buried copyright notice from the original game. Id
See 17 U.S.C. app. § 101 (1976); 17 U.S.C. app. § 102(a)(6) (1976).
25. 17 U.S.C. app. § 102(a) (1976).
26. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
27. 669 F.2d at 856.
28. Id.
29. The Seventh Circuit recently came to a similar conclusion when it compared video
games to news programs and their thematically related textual displays ("teletext") which
are transmitted on the same television signal but broadcast on different television channels.
The court found that these two displays constituted a single audiovisual work and that the
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focusing on the differences between individual plays on the game. the
court chose to concentrate on the many aspects of the sights and sounds
that remained constant between plays:
No doubt the entire sequence of all the sights and sounds of
the game are different each time the game is played, depend-
ing on the route and speed the player selects for his spaceship
and the timing and accuracy of his release of his craft's bombs
and lasers. Nevertheless, many aspects of the sights and the
sequence of their appearance remain constant during each
play of the game. These include the appearance (shape, color,
and size) of the player's spaceship, the enemy craft, the
ground missiles and fuel depots, and the terrain over which
(and beneath which) the player's flies, as well as the sequence
in which the missile bases, fuel depots, and terrain appears.3"
3. Originality
Next, Omni argued that the work was not an "original work of
authorship."'3 Since the player's participation produced a display that
was different for each play, Omni argued that each play was an original
work.32
Because the videotape on file with the Copyright Office recorded
only one possible sequence of play, and since each play is different,
Omni claimed that Konami secured copyright protection for only the
sequence of play on file.3 a The court dismissed this argument by again
emphasizing that the similarities outweighed the differences and that
the videotape on file covered any variations that might result from
player participation.34
4. Denouement
With the rejection of these two arguments, Stern became the first
federal appellate court to conclude that a video game's repetitive se-
quence of images is copyrightable as an audiovisual work.35 Scramble
was vindicated.
varied sequence of video game images constituted a single unit as well. Midway Mfg. Co. v.
Atic Int'l, Inc., No. 82-1607, slip op. (7th Cir. 1983) (available June 16, 1983, on LEXIS,
PATCOP Library, Cases file).




34. Id See also Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982).
35. 669 F.2d at 857.
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C The Copyrightability of Video Game Programs in Rom
1. Williams Electronics, Inc. v. Artic International., Inc.
The most recent argument for keeping video games outside the
protection of the copyright laws was advanced in Williams Electronics,
Inc. v. Artic International, Inc. 36 Unlike Stem Electronics. Inc., Wil-
liams Electronics, Inc. did not simply register the audiovisual display of
their "Defender" game; they registered the underlying program as
well.37 While emphasizing the computer-like aspects of video games
3
1
and after making the same fixation argument that Omni made in
Stern.3 9 Artic added new fuel to the controversy over the
copyrightability of video games when it contended that a copyright for
a video gameprogram is not infringed upon when the program is trans-
fered from one memory device to another.4"
A short time after William's "Defender" game became popular,
Artic's "Defense Command" made its appearance. In both Defender
and Defense Command, spaceships and aliens do battle with human-
like characters. The two game's characters and spaceships were virtu-
ally identical in shape, size, and color-as was the manner of move-
ment and interaction between game elements.4
Not only were the audiovisual displays virtually identical in the
two games, but the video game programs in the two games were virtu-
ally identical as well-imbedded copyright notice and all.4 2 Williams
was the first case to ask whether copyright protection could be used to
protect the underlying video game program as well as the audiovisual
display 3
In Williams the alleged infringer had made only minimal efforts to
avoid infringement by slightly changing the computer program."
Since it was clear that Artic had directly duplicated the program from
36. 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982).
37. Id at 874.
38. Id at 872-77.
39. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
40. 685 F.2d at 876.
41. Id at 872.
42. Id. Blatant video pirates rarely go through the trouble of changing the underlying
computer program. A buried copyright notice often shows up in the computer program
listing of the pirating chip, flagging the blatant knock-off. See 3 M. Nimmer. supra note 8,
at § 13.03[c].
43. Williams also sought to enforce its audiovisual copyright using several of the argu-
ments that had been successful in Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982).
See 685 F.2d at 873.
44. Id. at 876 n.6.
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the Defender game,4 5 Artic argued that the program transfered from
the original to the ersatz video game was in a form that was not copy-
rightable. In other words, Artic was arguing that by duplicating the
copyrighted computer program from William's chips to its own chips.
Artic was not making a "copy" and therefore one element of the test for
infringement had not been met.46
2. The Object Code Dilemma
a. unintelligibility
As with all video games, Artic's chips contained "object code."47
Object code or "machine language" is the language which computers
use to execute their most fundamental electronic functions. 8 It consists
of electronic pulses recorded on a magnetic medium-such as a ROM
chip, which are symbolically represented as ones and zeroes-the basic
language of electronic computers. 9 Object code is to be contrasted
with source code-programs written in high level languages such as
BASIC, PASCAL and COBOL-languages which must be translated
into object code before the computer can execute the program."
The problem with object code is that since it is unintelligible to
human beings and is not intended as a medium of communication to
human beings, some case law has denied," and some legal commenta-
tors have argued against, 2 copyright protection for object code. Artic
argued that since its chips contained only object code they could not be
deemed copies for infringement purposes. 3
b. an expansive reading of "copy"
The Williams court refused to follow this trend and opted instead
for an expansive reading of "copy" under the Copyright Act as applied
45. Id.
46. See supra note 8.
47. 685 F.2d at 876. Artic also raised the argument that ROMs are utilitarian objects
and are therefore not copyrightable. The Williams court concluded that it is not the ROM
itself that is the subject of the copyright but the program and audiovisual display that are
embodied in the chips. Id at 874-75.
48. Id. at 876-77 n.7-8.
49. Id.
50. Id
51. Data Cash Systems, Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1062 (N.D. Ill. 1979),
af'd on other grounds, 628 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1980). See also Apple Computer, Inc. v.
Franklin Computer Co., 545 F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
52. Stem, Another Look at Copyright Protection of Software: Did the 1980 Act Do Any-
thing for Object Code?, 3 Computer/L.J. 1 (1981).
53. 685 F.2d at 877.
19831
LO YOLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL
to object code fixed in a ROM.54 The court stated that congressional
intent called for "an expansive interpretation of the terms "fixation"
and "copy" which encompass technological advances such as those rep-
resented by the electronic devices in this case."5 The court, in effect,
conferred copyright status to object code contained in ROM.56
P. Conclusion
It appears clear then, that despite the apparent absence of a fixed
audiovisual display, and despite the presence of ROMs containing ob-
ject code programs, video game manufacturer's will continue to obtain
and enforce audiovisual and program copyrights.
The question now becomes: What is the scope of video game au-
diovisual copyrights? That is, what specific subject matter depicted in
the audiovisual display of a video game will be copyrightable?
III. THE SCOPE OF VIDEO GAME AUDIOVISUAL COPYRIGHTS
A. Introduction
Although video games have been classified as audiovisual works,
the elements and structure of a video game are clearly different from
those elements found in the other major member of the audiovisual
work category-motion pictures.
Are video games miniature movies? Are they player controlled
cartoons? Are they mini-stories with all the customary elements of a
literary work such as characters and a plot? Each of these categories
have become associated with its own set of analytic concepts for deter-
mining whether there has been a copyright infringement.57
54. The Williams court found support for this proposition in Tandy Co. v. Personal
Micro Computers, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 171, 175 (1981). A recent case that argues strongly for
denying copyright protection to object code is Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer
Co., 545 F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
The Seventh Circuit has recently distinguished Apple by emphasizing that Apple dealt
solely with computer programs and not with audiovisual works fixed in computer programs.
Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., No. 82-1607, slip op. (7th Cir. 1983) (available June 16,
1983, on LEXIS, PATCOP Library, Cases file). While this is an accurate assessment as to
the copyrightability of audiovisual displays, it begs the question raised in Williams of the
separate copyrightability of video game programs as embodied in ROM. It will be interest-
ing to see how this conflict between Tandy and Williams on one hand and Apple on the
other develops. In any event, audiovisual displays would be copyrightable even if the un-
derlying programs were not. Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 857 (2d Cir. 1982).
55. 685 F.2d at 877 n.8 and accompanying text.
56. Id.
57. See generally Berman & Boxer, Copyright Infringement of Audiovisual Works and
Characters, 52 S. Cal. L. Rev. 315 (1979).
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As we will soon see, the courts have borrowed concepts from both
motion picture and literary copyright analysis in order to ferret out the
protectable from the non-protectable in video games."
Further, the specific procedural framework that the circuit courts
have developed for applying these concepts will be shown to determine
whether the concepts are applied at all. That is, certain versions of
what has been termed the "bifurcated test of substantial similarity" will
be shown to, in effect, prevent the trier of fact from separating the pro-
tectable from the non-protectable in their determination of whether the
plaintiff has copied from the defendant's work.59
B. Copying, Substantial Similarity, and The Ordinary Observer Test
As was seen in the instances of blatant, identical copying, a prima
facie case of copyright infringement can be made out when the plaintiff
shows that he has satisfied the ownership and registration requirements
of the Copyright Act and that a requisite "copying," demonstrated by
the virtually identical audiovisual displays, has occurred.'
"Copying," however, is not as easily shown when the allegedly in-
fringing game is not virtually identical to the copyrighted game.6
When an infringing game is not virtually identical to the copyrighted
game, the plaintiff must rely on circumstantial evidence to establish a
sufficient copying.62 Circumstantial evidence sufficient to sustain a
finding of copying in the video game context is produced when the
plaintiff proves that the defendant had access to the original game and
that the two games are "substantially similar.
63
This is where things get muddy-but interesting. The traditional
test for determining substantial similarity, variously known as the "or-
dinary observer" or "audience test,"' is whether an ordinary ob-
server's spontaneous and immediate reaction to the works, "without
any aid or suggestion or critical analysis by others" would lead him to
conclude that the copy constitutes an improper appropriation of the
copyrighted work.65
The traditional ordinary observer test is based* on a reasonable
58. See infra notes 71-90 and accompanying text.
59. See infra notes 108-16 and accompanying text.
60. See supra note 7 for a list of cases.
6 1. See supra note 9 for a list of cases.
62. Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 614 (7th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 176 (1982). See also N. Boorstyn, supra note 8, at § 10:12-14.
63. Id
64. M. Nimmer, 3 Nimmer on Copyright, § 13.03[EIII] (1981).
65. Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witner, 65 F.2d 1, 18 (9th Cir. 1933).
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fear. The fear is, that if the trier of fact hears expert testimony or evi-
dence that analytically dissects or lists the dissimilarities of the works,
spontaneity will be lost. Without spontaneity the trier of fact will be
guided more by the disparities that he would otherwise be disposed to
overlook than by the overall "concept and feel of the work."66
Professor Nimmer has indicated however that "unfortunately,
there will be numerous instances when the ordinary observer is simply
not capable of detecting real appropriation without first making a criti-
cal comparison of the two works."67 Moreover, this formulation of the
ordinary observer test gives insufficient emphasis to the fact that a sin-
gle work may contain a combination of protectable and non-protect-
able elements.68 The term "mixed work" will be used to describe this
hybrid of protectable and non-protectable elements.
This "critical comparison" that Professor Nimmer refers to has
come to describe not only the dissection and analysis that occurs in
examining the clearly protectable elements of a work,69 but also to the
dissection and analysis that occurs in the application of such copyright
concepts as the "idea-expression dichotomy," "sc,'nesi faire," and the
"idea-expression unity"-copyright concepts which separate the pro-
tectable from the non-protectable elements of a copyrighted work.7"
In both instances, the "critical comparison" involves a level of
analysis and dissection which seems at first blush inimical to the spon-
taneity demanded by the traditional ordinary observer test. Instead, as
we will see, copyright theory demands that the ordinary observer be
allowed to balance analysis and dissection against spontaneity during a
substantial similarity determination.
It is this effort to achieve a critical balance between analysis and
spontaneity that should be at the heart of the substantial similarity test.
First, we will take a closer look at some of the concepts that are
essential to copyright analysis. Next, we will look at the current state of
the substantial similarity test, and determine whether any of the circuit
courts have achieved the critical balance between spontaneity and
analysis.
66. 3 M. Nimmer, supra note 64, at § 13.03[E][2]. See also Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v.
Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960).
67. 3 M. Nimmer, supra note 64, at § 13.03[E]12] (emphasis added).
68. See infra notes 115-16, and accompanying text.
69. See M. Nimmer, supra note 66.
70. See Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-America, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 125, 138-39 (D. N.J.
1982); See also id at 153 n.40.
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C Isolating the Protectable Elements
Before the trier of fact can make a substantial similarity analysis as
to the appropriation of protectable elements they must understand
three concepts that go to the heart of video game copyright law: the
idea-expression dichotomy; the idea-expression unity; and sc'nes d
faire.
1. The Idea-Expression Dichotomy
The idea-expression dichotomy is another way of stating the ax-
iom that copyright law protects the expression of ideas, and not ideas
themselves.7 For example, anyone is free to draw and publish their
own conception of what a mouse should look like. Copyright does not
protect the idea of "mouse." "If the only similarity between plaintiffs
and defendant's works is that of the abstract idea, there is an absence of
substantial similarity and hence no infringement results.""2 Copyright
law will however protect the original, creative, and artistic expression
that produced "Mickey Mouse."73
Every video game can be explained in abstract terms." PAC-
MAN is in simple, abstract terms, a maze game involving pursuit char-
71. N. Boorstyn, supra note 8, at § 10.14; See also Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips
Cosumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 615 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 176 (182);
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954); 17 U.S.C. app. § 102 (1976).
72. 672 F.2d at 615.
73. Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1132, 99 S. Ct. 1054 (1979).
74. See Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 615 (7th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 176 (1982):
There is no litmus paper test by which to apply the idea-expression distinction;
the determination is necessarily subjective. As Judge Learned Hand said, "obvi-
ously, no principle can be stated as to when an imitator has gone beyond copying
the 'idea', and has borrowed its 'expression.' Decisions must therefore inevitably
be ad hoc." Peter Pan Fabrics, 274 F.2d at 489. Courts and commentators never-
theless have developed a few helpful approaches. In Nichols v. Universal Pictures
Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931), Judge
Hand articulated what is now known as the "abstractions test":
U pon any work . . . a great number of patterns of increasing generality
will fit equally well, as more and more of the incidents will fit equally
well, as more and more of the incidents are left out. . . . [T]here is a
point in this series of abstractions where they are no longer protected,
since otherwise the playwright could prevent the use of his "ideas," to
which, apart from their expression, his property is never extended. No-
body has ever been able to fix that boundary, and nobody ever can ...
As respects plays, the controversy chiefly centers upon the characters and
sequence of incident, these being the substance.
(citations omitted). This "test" has proven useful in analyzing dramatic works,
literary works, and motion pictures, where the recurring patterns can readily be
abstracted into very general themes.
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acters and a main character that tries to accumulate points by gobbling
up dots. "Asteroids" is a spaceship versus spaceship war game with
meteor obstacles thrown in for dramatic effect. These are the ideas be-
hind the games and as such are in the public domain.75 In Atari, Inc. v.
Williams Electronics, Inc. 76 the District Court for the Eastern District
of California indicated:
There is nothing protectable under the copyright laws as
to the "Pac-Man" game itself, and the laws do not protect the
strategy of a player symbol being guided through a maze ap-
pearing to gobble up dots in its path while being chased
through the maze by several opponents. Further, the unpro-
tectable idea includes the rules, strategy, and progress of play
of the "Pac-Man" game. 7
While ideas are not copyrightable, particular expressions of video
game ideas are. A case in point is Midway Manufacturing Co. v.
Dirkschneider.78 In Midway the court found that Midway Manufactur-
ing Co's copyright on the video game "Galaxian" was not an attempt
to monopolize the "very idea of a video-game in which alien ships
break away from a convoy to attack a defender ship."7 9 The court
found that Galaxian was an audiovisual expression of various game
ideas. The expression included the distinctive color and design of the
space ships and other players, as well as the sounds that accompanied
the playing of the game."°
2. The Idea-Expression Unity
The "idea-expression unity" rule dictates that where the idea and
expression of the idea are indistinguishable, a copyright will only pro-
vide protection against identical copying.8 The frequently cited exam-
ple involved a plaintiff who held a copyright on a pin, encrusted with
jewels, and made in the shape of a bee. Any expression of the idea of a
bee pin would result in a piece of jewelry where the idea and expres-
A further refinement of the "abstractions test" termed the "patterns test", was devel-
oped by Professor Chafee in Chafee, Rejections on the Law of Copyright, 45 Colum. L. Rev.
503 (1945).
75. 672 F.2d at 617; Atari, Inc. v. Amusement World, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 222, 229 (D.
Md. 1981).
76. 1982 Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) 1 25,412 (E.D. Cal. 1981).
77. Id. at 17,386.
78. 543 F. Supp. 466 (D. Neb. 1981).
79. Id at 480.
80. Id at 480.
81. Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Co. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971); see also
N. Boorstyn, supra note 8, at § 10:14.
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sion are virtually indistinguishable. Since the expression of a bee pin
provides nothing new or additional over the idea of a bee pin, any ex-
pression of the idea would necessarily produce a substantially similar
expression.82
The idea-expression unity rule was considered and found inappli-
cable in Atar, Inc. v. Amusement World, Inc. 83 Atari sought to enjoin
the manufacture and distribution of "Meteors" a game which Atari
claimed had its inspiration in Atari's game, "Asteroids."84 Both games
involve a player commanded spaceship that tries to manuever around
meteors and enemy ships.85 The court found that the idea of a video
game in which the player shoots his way through a barrage of space
rocks is an idea that is sufficiently general as to permit more than one
form of expression. Atari's "Asteroids" audiovisual copyright was
therefore not limited to protection against identical copying only.86
3. Sc'nes a Faire
The third copyright concept which the trier of fact may consider in
making a substantial similarity determination is that of sci'nes ifaire.87
ScNnes ibfaire is a concept from the context of literary copyrights and
refers to "incidents, characters,or setting which are as a practical matter
indispensable, or at least standard, in the treatment of a given topic."88
82. 446 F.2d 738.
83. 547 F. Supp. 222 (D. Md. 1981).
84. Id. at 224.
85. Id.
86. Id at 229.
87. Although there has been some recent criticism of the scknes dfaire doctrine, Note,
Copyright Infringement: An Argumentfor the Elimination of the Scenes a Faire Doctrine, 5
Comm/Ent L.J. 147 (1982), the scknes bfaire doctrine is particularly well suited to separat-
ing the protectable from the non-protectable elements in games in general, and video games
in particular. Atari, Inc. v. Amusement World, Inc., 547 F. supp. 222, 228-29 (D. Md. 1981).
In applying the scines it/aire doctrine to game rules the First Circuit Court of Appeals
in Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678-79 (Ist Cir. 1967) noted:
When the uncopyrightable subject matter is very narrow, so that the "topic neces-
sarily requires, if not only one form of expression, at best only a limited number, to
permit copyrighting would mean that a party or parties, by copyrighting a mere
handful of forms, could exhaust all possibilities of future use of the substance. In
such circumstances it does not seem accurate to say that any particular form of
expression comes from the subject matter. However, it is necessary to say that the
subject matter would be appropriated by permitting the copyrighting of its expres-
sion. We cannot recognize copyright as a game of chess in which the public can be
checkmated.
See also Affiliated Hospital Products, Inc. v. Merdel Game Manufacturing Co., 513 F.2d
1183, 1188-89 (2d Cir. 1975); Durham Industries, Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 914-15
(2d Cir. 1980).
88. Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 616 (7th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 176 (1982).
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For example, the following incidents would not be copyrightable in
mystery novel: The butler as the one-who-did-it; a bumbling detective;
chase scenes; a group confrontation scene where all the suspects are
brought together for the final showdown.
8 9
In Amusement World, for example, the court found that the similar
expressions simply could not be avoided in any version of the basic
idea of a video game in which a player fights his way through space
rocks and enemy spaceships.9 °
4. Putting It All Together
Illustrating all three concepts is Atari Inc. v. North American
Philips Consumer Electronics Corp. 9' Atari, Inc. and Midway Manu-
facturing sought to enjoin North American from distributing a PAC-
MAN look alike, K.C. Munchkin. Both PAC-MAN and K.C.
Munchkin involve maze games where the central player controls char-
acters that try to consume as many "dots" and "pursuit characters" as
possible before the central character is himself consumed by pursuit
characters.
92
The court found that the idea behind PAC-MAN was that of a
primarily unprotectible maze game. The idea behind PAC-MAN is
not copyrightable. 93 But unlike the bee pin, PAC-MAN may be ac-
corded copyright protection because the idea of PAC-MAN and the
expression of PAC-MAN are distinguishable.94 The games shapes,
sizes, colors, and sounds add something new and additional over the
abstract idea of a maze game.95 PAC-MAN therefore was not limited
by the idea-expression unity rule which would have limited copyright
protection to virtually identical copying only.9 6
In PAC-MAN, while the maze design, scoring table, and dots were
sufficient expressions to fall outside the idea-expression unity rule, the
court found that they were such standard game devices that they
should be treated as scibnes afaire and would receive protection from
89. See Alexander v. Haley, 460 F. Supp. 40, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). See also Franklin
Mint Corp. v. Nat. Wildlife Exchange, 575 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. den'd 439 U.S. 880;
Yankwich, Originality in the Law of Intellectual Property, 11 F.R.D. 457, 462 (1951).
90. Atari, Inc. v. Amusement World, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 222, 229-30 (D. Md. 1981).
91. 672 F.2d 607, 616 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 176 (1982).
92. Id at 610-13.






virtually identical copying only.9"
The aspects of PAC-MAN that are not sc'nes 2faire are PAC-
MAN, the pursuit ghosts, the special sounds used to accompany the
characters movements, and the special movements of the characters.
The characters are wholly fanciful and their use does not inevitably
flow from the concept of a maze chase game.9"
K.C. Munchkin was substantially similar to PAC-MAN. The
Munchkin gobbler had the same relative size as PAC-MAN. It had the
same V-shaped mouth and distinctive gobbling action accompanied by
sounds. The pursuit ghosts were virtually identical to the PAC-MAN
counterparts. Finally, the court observed that in the capture sequence,
"both games, moreover, express the role reversal and 'regeneration'
process with such similarity that an ordinary observer could conclude
only that North American copied plaintiffs PAC-MAN." 99
D. Mod!fications of the Ordinary Observer Test- The Circuit
Breakdown
Responding to the inadequacies of the traditional" ordinary ob-
server test, at least three federal circuits have formulated their own tests
of substantial similarity. Each test is an attempt to reconcile the need
for a spontaneous ordinary observer-undistracted by "? ny particular
impressions of similarity found by examining the two works" '-with
the analytic concepts which have been developed to separate out the
protectable from the non-protectable elements of a given work.10 2
1. Arnstein v. Porter: Introducing the Bifurcated Test
The first major modification of the non-analytic ordinary observer
test was made by the Second Circuit in Arnstein v. Porter. °3 Arnstein's
bifurcated test of substantial similarity attempted to retain the sponta-
neity of the ordinary observer test while allowing for analysis and dis-
section by dividing the issue of substantial similarity into two separate
elements. 104
If there is evidence of access and similarities exist, then
97. Id
98. Id. at 617-18.
99. Id.
100. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
101. See supra note 66.
102. See supra notes 71-90 and accompanying text.
103. 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).
104. See 3 M. Nimmer, supra note 64, at § 13.03[E]13].
1983]
LO YOLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL
the trier of fact must determine whether the similarities are
sufficient to prove copying. On this issue, analysis ('dissec-
tion') is relevant, and the testimony of experts may be re-
ceived to aid the trier of fact. . . . If copying is established,
then only does there arise the second issue, that of illicit copy-
ing (unlawful appropriation). On that issue. . . the test is the
response of the ordinary lay hearer (or observer), accordingly,
on that issue, dissection and expert testimony is irrelevant. 105
One problem with the original Arnstein formulation was that it did
not explain the difference between "copying" and "illicit copying."
The Second Circuit later indicated that illicit copying is "merely an
alternative way of formulating the issue of substantial similarity."'"
This circularity of language was finally interpreted as evidence of the
Second Circuit's merger of the Arnstein bifurcated test into a single
pronged lay-ordinary observer test for substantial similarity.
10 7
Still, the present Second Circuit test seemingly goes beyond the
traditional ordinary observer test by implicitly allowing the trier of fact
to apply dissection and analysis in service of separating the protectable
ideas from the non-protectable expressions."°
Despite the seeming demise of the bifurcated test in the Second
Circuit, modified versions of the Arnstein two-step live on in the Ninth
and Third Circuits.
2. The Ninth Circuit Test
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Sid & Marty Krofft Televi-
sion Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp. "o created a bifurcated test
based upon the idea-expression dichotomy."1o
Under Krofft, the first step, termed the "extrinsic test," is to deter-
mine whether the general ideas contained in the two works are substan-
tially similar."' The test is termed "extrinsic" because the
determination turns "not on the responses of the trier of fact, but on
105. 154 F.2d at 468.
106. Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu, Ltd., 360 F.2d 1021 (2d Cir. 1966).
107. Ideal Toy Corp. v. Kenner Prods., 443 F. Supp. 291, 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
108. See Warner Bros. Inc. v. Am. Broadcasting Cos., 654 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1981); see
also Sheldon v. Metro-Golden Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936), cert. den'd., 298
U.S. 669, 56 S. Ct. 835 (1936); Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 913 (2d
Cir. 1980).
109. 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977): hereinafter cited as Kroff'.




specific criteria which can be listed and analyzed.""' 2 It must be em-
phasized, however, that it is only idea similarity that is in issue under
the extrinsic test.' 
13
The second step under Krofft, termed the "intrinsic test," focuses
on the protectable elements of the work-the expressions. The ques-
tion under the "intrinsic test" is whether an ordinary observer, without
the aid of expert testimony, analysis, or dissection, would decide that
"there is substantial similarity in the expressions of the ideas so as to
constitute infringement.""' 4 The intrinsic test has been appropriately
termed the "gut-reaction" '"I- test. The second prong of the Krofft test is
basically the traditional non-analytic ordinary observer test."
6
As we will see, under the ordinary observer prong of the Ninth
Circuit's Krofft test, the trier of fact is unnecessarily limited to a non-
analytic "gut-response" which limits the trier of fact's ability to make
an informed decision as to the substantial similarity of protectable
elements.
This flaw in the Krofft test becomes especially apparent once it is
realized that video game displays are "mixed works." A single video
display will contain a mixture of protectable and non-protectable ele-
ments. Non-protectable elements such as scoring tables and mazes will
be mixed in with protectable elements such as cartoon characters and
specific character movements.' 17
Further, the Krofft analysis does not allow for the fact that video
game displays are similar to movies in that it would be impossible for
112. Id
113. Professor Nimmer has indicated that basing the two stages of the test on the idea-
expression unity "unnecessarily limited the scope of the court's determination under the
preliminary, extrinsic, test." 3 M. Nimmer, supra note 64, at § 13.03[E][3]. And:
The effect of the Krofft bifurcated test is to expand the domain of the trier of fact,
and to greatly contract the role of the court, at least in its power to rule for the
defendant as a matter of law," but since the only issue under this test is that of idea
similarity, and since in almost all copyright litigation the plaintiff will not file an
action unless there is at a minimum some similarity of ideas, under Krofft a court
will rarely have the power either to rule for the defendant in advance of trial, or to
reverse on appeal a jury determination for the plaintiff. (footnote omitted)
Further, because some dissection is required to apply the concept of scnes faire, and
because seines i'faire have been construed as expressions, it is unlikely that a trier of fact
would be allowed to consider the scenes 4faire doctrine. See infra notes 117-26 and accom-
panying text.
114. 562 F.2d at 1164.
115. A term which has become popular with Ninth Circuit copyright attorneys, but which
has yet to grace a published opinion.
116. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
117. E.g., Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 616 (7th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 176 (1982).
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the court to make a preliminary separation of the expressions from the
ideas, and then allow the trier of fact to consider only the expressions.
This separation would destroy the essential character of the audiovisual
work-a character which is determined by the interaction of the sepa-
rate aural and visual elements." 8
3. The Third Circuit Test
The Third Circuit in Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld, l9
while not basing its bifurcated test on the idea-expression dichotomy,
retained the separation of analytic and non-analytic review.120 In the
first step the trier of fact may resort to analysis and dissection to deter-
mine whether the defendant has copied the plaintiff's work.' 2 1 In the
second step, the trier of fact must "concentrate upon the gross features
rather than an examination of minutiae" to determine whether "the
copying went so far as to constitute improper appropriation." 2 2 Under
Universal, both elements involve a finding of substantial similarity;
23
the main difference between the two forms of substantial similarity be-
ing the extent to which analysis is permitted.
24
Recently, the Third Circuit, in Midway Manufacturing Co. v.
Bandai-America, Inc., 25 recognized and articulated the need for dis-
section and analysis under both prongs of its bifurcated test. In other
words, the Third Circuit has recognized that a pure "gut-reaction" or
non-analytic ordinary observer test is both practically and theoretically
unworkable. "Although dissection is disfavored on the issue of sub-
stantial similarity going to appropriation, the ordinary observer test
118. See Berman & Boxer, Copyright Infringement of Audiovisual Works and Characters,
52 S. Cal. L. Rev. 315 (1979).
119. 511 F.2d 904 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. den'd, 423 U.S. 863 (1975).
120. See id. at 907.
121. Id.
122. id. at 908-09.
123. Id at 907.
124. Id. at 907-09. After stating that "when attempting to demonstrate improper appro-
priation via the second form of substantial similarity, however, dissection and expert testi-
mony are irrelevant," the court goes on to itself analyze and dissect the works in question.
ld at 908-09. As was finally articulated in Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-America, Inc., 546
F. Supp. 125, 153 n.40 (D. N.J. 1982), the court was implicitly advancing a balancing test
where the trier of fact may analyze and dissect in the second prong of the test. When the
trier of fact actually decides whether there is an appropriation they must decide spontane-
ously, qua ordinary observer. While psychologically this may be a subtle test to apply, it is
the only test that appears consistent with copyright theory. See infra notes 123-28 and ac-
companying text.
125. Midway Mfg. v. Bandai-America, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 125, 153 n.40 (D. N.J. 1982)
(quoting Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 616 (7th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 176 (1982).
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must descend into details where necessary to distill the protectable ele-
ments from the work."'
126
In Bandai-America the Third Circuit reviewed the influence of
Universal and expressed its awareness of the subtle balancing act that
is required in a determination of substantial similarity:
In the UniversalAthletic case, the Third Circuit was deal-
ing solely with the type of substantial similarity which goes to
the appropriation issue since it accepted the district court's
finding that there had been copying. The Third Circuit noted
that it was "dif7fcult to explain all the points of similarity and
dissimilarity between the works without going into great detail."
Presumably, going into such details would be impermissable
on this branch of the substantial similarity inquiry. This
quote and the one above perhaps indicate the Third Circuit's
awareness that its decision puts a trial court in the very deli-
cate position of having to identfy sufficiently similarities between
two works to justfy a finding of appropriation without simulta-
neously making the identification impermissably detailed so as
to constitute forbidden "dissection". Perhaps the Third Cir-
cuit's teaching in this connection is simply, as it states, that a
court should focus upon the gross features rather than ex-
amine minutiae when determining substantial similarity for
appropriation purposes. This court will proceed on the as-
sumption that this is the ultimate meaning of the Universal
Athletic case and will attempt to walk the fine line between the
permissable and impermissable in its comparison of the works
before it. The delicacy of this inquiry is compounded by the
fact that numerous courts have observed, determinations of
copyright infringement are largely made on an ad hoc basis,
the test for infringement necessarily being vague and seem-
ingly arbitrary.
127
While the Third Circuit has yet to explicitly renounce the artificial
separation of analytical dissection from spontaneity under its ordinary
observer test, it has done so implicitly. The Third Circuit has come the
closest to adopting an ordinary observer test that consciously balances
the importance of critical analysis and dissection of protectable and
non-protectable elements against the importance of spontaneity and
126. 546 F. Supp. 125 (D. N.J. 1982).
127. Id at 138 (citations omitted, emphasis added).
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the overall feel of a work.
21
E. Practical Consequences of the Circuit Split.- "Gut-Reactions"
versus the "Balancing Test"
The critical question posed by the circuit split is not whether a
bifurcated test is preferable to a single-pronged ordinary observer test.
Although the choice of a single-pronged test over a bifurcated test will
have certain procedural consequences,' 29 this factor will not in itself be
determinative of whether a trier of fact will be reasonable in its finding
of substantial similarity-or lack thereof.
What is determinative, is whether the trier of fact is afforded the
opportunity to consider the protectable expressions separately from the
non-protectable ideas of the work.
The test for predicting whether a given work will be found sub-
stantially similar to another work under a balancing approach to the
ordinary observer test which appears to be most faithful to both sponta-
neity and copyright theory appears to be this: Describe the game in as
abstract terms as possible. This process will define the abstract, non-
protectable idea which will serve as the basis for producing the expres-
sions. In PAC-MAN it was the idea of a maze chase. Next, consider
only those expressions which are not essential to the expression of this
type of game or video games in general. The inevitable expressions,
the sc'nes bifaire: score-keeping devices and maze designs for exam-
ple-must be virtually identical in the two games to sustain a finding of
substantial similarity.
Once the non-essential expressions are isolated in the minds of the
trier of fact, then these distilled expressions may serve as the basis for a
determination of substantial similarity or lack thereof. These expres-
sions are the residue that the trier of fact may then focus on and react
to in as spontaneous a manner as is psychologically possible while at
the same time remaining conscious of the distinction between the pro-
tectable and non-protectable elements of the work. During this entire
128. While not specifically articulating the need for a balancing test, the Seventh Circuit
has recognized the necessity of dissection during the ordinary observer test:
When the alleged infringing work is not a duplicate of the copyrighted work, a
determination of whether protected elements have been taken requires a close
analysis of differences and similarities between the two works. E. Kitch & H. Perl-
man, Legal regulation of the Competitive Process 665 (2d Ed. 1979). This type of
analysis often is necessary to reach a general, subjective conclusion regarding sub-
stantial similarity.
Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 614 n.6 (7th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 176 (1982).
129. See 3 M. Nimmer, supra note 64, at § 13.03[E]13].
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process the trier of fact must remember that while their conclusion
should be based on the work as a whole, it is the "total concept and
feel"' 3 ° of the protectable elements only that must be dispositive of
whether the works are substantially similar.
It would follow from a balancing test that a game which modified
the scones afaire elements of PAC-MAN to avoid a charge of identical
copying, and completely changed the cast of characters, sounds and
characteristic movements of the characters would not be found to in-
fringe on the PAC-MAN audiovisual copyright. While similarities be-
tween the two game's scones difaire elements would be striking, the jury
would be made sufficiently aware of the non-protectable elements of
the display so that their conclusions would be based principally upon a
consideration of the protectable expressions-the non-substantially
similar characters, movements, and sounds.
A trier of fact who had been instructed to balance the analytical
separation of expressions from ideas against the need for spontaneity
would properly conclude that the works were not substantially similar.
Under the same facts, the trier of fact in a court that does not allow
for analysis during the ordinary observer examination would be in-
clined to find infringement even in those instances where the only ap-
propriation has been an appropriation of non-protectable elements
such as scones bfaire.
Essentially, a bifurcated or single-pronged test that recognizes the
importance of a balance between "spontaneity" and "analysis" during
the ordinary observer examination is essential to the substantial simi-
larity analysis. Otherwise, conceptual consistency is lost.
F Conclusion
If the trier of fact ever gets to examine the works,' 3 ' he must be
made aware of the fact that the display may contain non-protectable
elements such as scones tdfaire. The trier of fact is under a duty to
make his assessment of the work based on a consideration of the pro-
tectable elements of the work as distilled from the non-protectable ele-
ments. As recognized by the Third Circuit, this will invariably require
some dissection and analysis. It may even require an enumeration of
the protectable elements as contrasted with the non-protectable.
Under any other test, a finding of substantial similarity may be
130. See Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970).
131. See supra note I11.
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based more on a "gut-response" to the work's non-protectable elements
than on a subtle balancing of the protectable against the non-protect-
able. Further, the balancing should be conducted in such a way that it
remains clear to the trier of fact that analysis should not outweigh
spontaneity. The subtle balancing and analytic sophistication required
by this version of the ordinary observer test cannot be an excuse for a
court's failure to recognize the practical and logical consistency of such
a balancing test.
Now can I have some more quarters?
